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On the efﬁ  cacy of ﬁ  nancial regulations
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Professor
London School of Economics
Regulatory failures have been a signiﬁ  cant contributor to the ﬁ  nancial crisis, but that does not automatically 
mean more regulation is called for. The crisis happened because ﬁ  nancial institutions and the whole 
economy used seemingly inﬁ  nite amounts of cheap credit to create an asset price bubble. The banks 
played their part by creating all these complex structured products that continue causing difﬁ  culties. 
They did this under direct regulatory oversight. 
Such excessive credit expansion is how most ﬁ  nancial crises have played out throughout history. The exact 
same process can be prevented from happening in the future, but surely the next crisis will take a different 
form.  It will be something completely unforeseen. One cannot regulate against such unforeseen events.
The crisis has its roots in the most regulated parts of the ﬁ  nancial system, the banks, whilst the least 
regulated part, the hedge funds, are mostly innocent.
Is the problem lack of regulation?  Or is the problem lack of understanding on how to regulate ﬁ  nancial 
institutions properly?  Depending upon the answer to the question, the correct approach to future ﬁ  nancial 
regulations will be very different. 
The unique element this time around has been the extensive use of statistical models to forecast prices, and 
risk as well as to price complex assets. It was the models that failed. Such models embed an assumption 
of risk being exogenous; market participants react to the ﬁ  nancial system but do not change it. In practice, 
this is nonsense. 
Market participants, especially in a crisis, receive the same signals and react in a similar way; they exert 
signiﬁ  cant price impact resulting in risk being endogenous. This implies ﬁ  nancial risk models are the least 
reliable when we need them the most and that regulation by risk sensitivity, such as risk sensitive bank 
capital, may increase ﬁ  nancial instability.
The root causes of the crisis are the same as in most ﬁ  nancial crises throughout history. These crises have 
happened under a wide range of regulatory mechanisms. Blaming the crisis on a narrow set of obvious 
regulatory causes, such as bonuses, hedge funds, universal banking, shadow banking, structured credit, 
lack of regulations, inadequate risk management is attacking a straw man. It takes the focus away from 
the necessary detailed examination of the causes of ﬁ  nancial instability, which is the only way to design 
effective regulatory mechanisms.
We do not clearly understand what went wrong, and know even less how to design regulations to prevent 
such episodes from happening in the future, whilst maintaining the efﬁ  ciency of the ﬁ  nancial system. 
This is why it would be preferable to study what went wrong and then in a few years carefully change 
regulations at a time when we know more. There is no hurry, we still haven’t solved this crisis and the next 
one will not come immediately after the current crisis. The costs of inappropriate regulations are high and 
we do have the time to wait.
NB: Research papers of the author can be downloaded from www.riskresearch.org.
FSR13_DANIELSSON.indd   53 FSR13_DANIELSSON.indd   53 01/07/2009   16:05:45 01/07/2009   16:05:45ARTICLES
Jón Daníelsson “On the efﬁ  cacy of ﬁ  nancial regulations”
54  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 13 – The future of ﬁ  nancial regulation ￿ September 2009
T
he ﬁ  nancial crisis has been blamed on the 
failure of ﬁ  nancial regulation, with more, and 
immediate, regulation the best way forward. 
However, the case for more regulation is not that 
clear. After all, the crisis has its roots in the most 
regulated parts of the ﬁ  nancial system, the banks, 
whilst is the least regulated part, the hedge funds, 
are mostly innocent. 
Is the problem lack of regulation?  Or is the problem 
that we don’t really know how to regulate ﬁ  nancial 
institutions properly?  Depending on answer to the 
question the correct approach to future ﬁ  nancial 
regulations will be very different. 
The prudent way forward is to ﬁ  rst identify how 
ﬁ  nancial regulations failed and try to ﬁ  nd new 
approaches to regulation before regulating everything 
in sight. Inappropriate or ineffective regulation can 
be damaging to the economy and increase ﬁ  nancial 
instability.
The crisis is from a historical context rather typical. 
Financial institutions increase lending in an 
economic upturn, positively affecting asset values, 
thus collateral, stimulating future lending.  As banks 
chase increasingly bad credits, asset values are 
more and more out of touch with the underlying 
fundamentals. It takes an increasingly small event 
to cause a rapid reversal. We go ‘up by the escalator 
down by the elevator’ — banking is procyclical. 
One thing that is unique this time around is the 
role of models in pricing, decision making and risk 
analysis. Indeed, a cursory glance at writings on 
the topic of the past years — prior to the crisis — 
one gets the impression that models represented a 
level of scientiﬁ  c ﬁ  nance, that we have managed to 
accurately represent the ﬁ  nancial system by a series 
of equations. One of the earliest ofﬁ  cial expressions 
of this view is the Amendment to the capital accord to 
incorporate market risks (1996). 
Models have had a profound impact on ﬁ  nance, both 
positive and negative. Many individuals  have a rose 
tinted view of the efﬁ  cacy of ﬁ  nancial models, not 
realising the impacts of issues such as risk sensitive 
bank capital. 
The nature of ﬁ  nancial risk on a fundamental level 
is not known, rendering formal statistical modeling 
of ﬁ  nancial risk rather difﬁ  cult at best. The reason is 
that the ﬁ  nancial system is composed of intelligent 
human beings that react to the world around them, 
including what the models say. 
Under observation, the ﬁ  nancial system changes. 
When models are put to use, the ﬁ  nancial system 
changes. Therefore, attempting to systematically 
forecast prices or risk using past observations is 
generally impossible. 
The output of most risk models, especially when 
they aggregate a large number of positions is quite 
unreliable. Getting risk measurements may provide 
comfort, but if the numbers are unreliable the 
comfort is false. Relying on risk models, especially 
for supervisors thinking about systemic risk, is the 
lazy way out.  Especially considering the rather poor 
quality of state-of-the-art models.
In particular, exploiting the banks’ internal models 
for the purpose of measuring systemic risk is not 
the right way to do it. The internal models were not 
designed with this in mind and to do this calculation 
is a drain on the banks’ risk management resources. 
If we don’t understand how the system works, 
generating numbers may give us comfort. But the 
numbers do not imply understanding.
Unfortunately, many of the proposals for reform of 
the ﬁ  nancial system are based on risk measurements 
and risk sensitivity, proposals in areas such 
as systemic risk and compensation. There is 
considerable research going on in this area is at the 
moment, the next crisis is not coming anytime soon. 
It would be better to delay the reform until we know 
more about what we are trying to regulate.
1| THE NATURE 
  AND MEASUREMENT OF RISK
In 1921, Frank Knight made his increasingly 
famous distinction between risk and uncertainty. 
With risk we can assign mathematical probabilities 
to randomness whilst with uncertainty we can not. 
Stated differently, we can measure and model risk 
but not uncertainty.
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Randomness in the ﬁ  nancial system is either risk 
or uncertainty. Policy makers need to pick one. The 
choice leads to a very different approach to ﬁ  nancial 
regulation.
The founding philosophy of most risk systems is risk 
measurability. The key part is a model — sort of a 
black box — into one end goes data, out the other 
comes a measurement like Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR 
assumes randomness is risk in the Knightian sense. 
It is founded on the notion that the ﬁ  nancial system 
can be represented by a sequence of mathematical 
equations, where one only need to ﬁ  nd the right 
equations to measure risk. 
VaR along with most, if not all, risk models 
currently in common use assumes that market 
data follows a stochastic process that only depends 
on past observations of itself and other market 
variables. Obviously, this facilitates modeling, but 
unfortunately by construction can only capture 
randomness when ﬁ  nancial markets not in turmoil, 
at times when we can more or less safely assume 
that risk is exogenous.
These risk models assume that randomness is risk 
and not uncertainty in the Knightian sense. This 
means that the appropriate way to forecast risk is to 
take a chunk of historical data and feed it through 
a statistical model, whose purpose it is to deliver 
the distribution of the underlying data so that we 
can assign mathematical probabilities to particular 
outcomes. If the results are less than satisfactory, 
the solution is to further develop the model and/or 
expand the data set. All still comfortably within the 
universe of Knightian risk. In this particular view, 
the problem of imperfect risk measurement has a 
simple solution — more sophistication. So long as 
we have the right model we can measure risk. But 
is this really true? 
Many market participants and policy makers think 
so, a phenomenon that may be called the myth of 
the riskometer (Daníelsson, 2009). It is based on the 
notion that we can stick some sort of a riskometer 
deep into the bowels of the ﬁ  nancial system and 
get accurate measurements of the risk of complex 
ﬁ  nancial products. 
Where does this belief in the riskometer come from?   
Perhaps from applying what we know about natural 
sciences — physics — to the ﬁ  nancial system. If the 
laws of physics are known, it is possible to create 
the most sophisticated structures and understand 
risk of those structures on a deep fundamental level. 
Randomness is risk not uncertainty, and the riskometer 
exists. In physical systems if we don’t understand 
the riskiness, the solution is more complexity.
1|1  Challenges in forecasting 
 market  risk
The most commonly used method for forecasting 
market risk is VaR, ever since its introduction to 
ﬁ  nancial regulations in the 1996 Amendment to the 
Basel Accords.
VaR has well documented ﬂ  aws.  Theoretically, 
it is not subadditive, (see Artzner et al., 1999) 
something that is hard to overcome in practice. The 
alternative risk measures that have been proposed 
as a replacement tend to be difﬁ  cult or impossible 
to implement in practical use, methods such as tail 
VaR. For the better or worse, we seem to be stuck 
with VaR.
Besides the theoretic deﬁ   ciencies, VaR gives 
surprisingly inaccurate risk forecasts, something 
repeatedly demonstrated, e.g. by Daníelsson (2002).
To address the accuracy of VaR consider what is one 
of the easiest risk forecasting exercises, daily VaR for 
IBM stock for the ﬁ  rst day of the year from 2000-2009 
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with the most common models and assumptions used 
by the ﬁ  nancial sector.1 While the detailed results 
and the computer code is available for download2   
summary results are shown in Chart 1. It shows the 
maximum and minimum VaR across all the methods 
each year for the portfolio.
The difference between the lowest and highest VaR 
forecasts is lowest in 2003 at 50%. Most of the time 
it is more than double, reaching 320% in 2005. This 
points to the general unreliability of VaR as a measure 
of risk. Not only are the estimates very different 
dependent on the methods and assumptions, it is 
very challenging to select which estimate is best, as 
backtesting methods lack in robustness.
1|2  Death by a thousand cuts
One surprising result out of the Chart above, is how 
low the VaR is for the ﬁ  rst day of this year, at the 
height of the crisis. Whilst asset values are collapsing, 
VaR indicates that the risk then is lower than at the 
beginning of the decade. Clearly, our perception of 
risk is much higher than then, so what is wrong? 
One reason is that most risk models are dependent on 
some heroic assumptions. One of the most important 
is the focus on one-day VaR. The reason is simple, 
trying to forecast VaR for anything but one day is much 
harder than one day forecasting. The multi-day holding 
periods favored by some may provide the comfort of 
a number, but add little or no information to one day 
VaRs. They are either based on multi-day holding 
periods and hence inevitably small sampling periods, 
or use scaling law to get multi-day VaR, typically 
square root of time. In that case, the multi-day VaR is 
really only a single day VaR scaled up by a constant, 
and has exactly the same information content.
Another assumption that is usually made in VaR 
forecasting is that the mean is zero. This is generally 
reasonable, the mean is an order of magnitude lower 
than the VaR, and can therefore often be safely 
ignored. Specifying the mean would be after all quite 
challenging since there is no obvious number one 
could use.
Suppose, however, that the average return is 
somewhat negative, at the same time VaR is low. 
That will not be such a surprising state of the world, 
because VaR is only one point on the distribution of 
returns and does not capture the thickness of the tail 
or the real underlying risk.
In this case, we would experience multiple days of 
small negative returns — slowly bleeding out from 
thousand cuts. The signal from the risk measure is 
that everything is ﬁ  ne, whilst those in the market 
know it is anything but.
This often happens when markets are trending 
down. It is not uncommon for the markets to jump 
away from the trend, so that in boom markets prices 
trickle up and jump down. In bear markets it is the 
opposite. Surprisingly, the lower tails can be thinner 
in crisis than when things are better.
1|3  Models of systemic risk 
  and asset dependence
The example above focuses on the problem of forecasting 
VaR for a single asset, and even in that case, the risk 
measurements are highly uncertain. Attempting to 
model portfolio risk is much harder still and even more 
so for some recent models of systemic risk based on 
conditional tail probabilities such as CoVar.
When modeling portfolio risk, we need to incorporate 
the interrelations between assets. Naïvely, one 
could do this with constant correlations, but then 
immediately run into the problem that correlations 
change often quite sharply over time. Two assets can 
be highly positively correlated one week, and sharply 
negatively correlated the following week, a phenomena 
known in the jargon as non-linear dependence.
Most risk models in practical use are still dependent 
on constant correlations as relaxing the assumption 
makes most models of dependence not estimable 
as the number of assets increases.
There is considerable research going on in more 
advanced methods for measuring such non-linear 
1  Estimation windows are 260, 500, 1,000 and 2,500 days, and the methods are historical simulation, moving window, exponential moving average, GARCH and 
fat tailed GARCH.
2 risk.lse.ac.uk/rr/ﬁ  les/bdf-2009.zip
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dependence, such as copula models, conditional 
tail dependence methods, conditional VaR and 
tail dependence. Unfortunately, they generally 
only work with very small portfolios, perhaps 
only two assets, and even in that case either rely 
on heroic simplifying assumptions or are quite 
technically involved. 
Conceptually, such methods are interesting because 
they theoretically capture the dynamic structure of 
tail dependence. They do have certain attractiveness 
for the modeling of systemic risk and contagion. 
As practical methods for implementation, they are 
challenging as they compound three sources of error 
in estimation, the VaR calculation, the dependence 
structure, and the conditional tail probabilities.
1|4  Challenges in measuring credit risk
Credit risk presents different challenges. In the crisis, 
it is credit risk, and not market risk that has been 
the most important risk factor, in particular all the 
complex instruments, credit default swaps — CDSs, 
collateralised debt obligations — CDOs, structured 
investment vehicules — SIVs and the rest.
Some of the ﬁ  rst instruments to be affected by the 
crisis were CDOs on US subprime mortgages. The 
mistakes in risk analysis of those instruments are 
illustrative of the subsequent difﬁ  culties in the 
credit markets.
Tranches of CDOs attracted credit ratings like any 
other corporate bond, but they are not like any 
other corporate bond. Coval et al. (2008) note that 
the particular prioritisation rule which allows senior 
tranches to have low default probabilities, and get 
high credit ratings, also implies that the risk in 
senior tranches is particularly concentrated on 
systematically bad economic outcomes — the CDOs 
are in effect economic catastrophe bonds. When 
default correlations increase during an economic 
downturn, we quickly observe that many senior 
tranches suffer from much higher rates of defaults 
than envisioned. 
The subprime market took off in the early stages 
of the business cycle, under economic conditions 
that were generally improving; implying mortgage 
defaults were relatively independent events, 
reﬂ  ecting individual difﬁ  culties rather than general 
economic problems. 
Unfortunately, the data samples used to rate the 
CDOs contain subprime mortgages are not long 
enough to include a recession. This means in the 
data sample correlations are low. Even if the same 
contained a downturn it would be difﬁ  cult to estimate 
them, as noted by Dufﬁ  e (2007), there is a serious 
lack of good models for estimating correlations.
The sensitivity of the senior tranches is easily 
demonstrated with a typical CDO. Suppose we 
have a portfolio of 10 bonds each containing 
subprime mortgages and having 25% annual default 
probabilities. Of course, 25% may be a bit extreme, but 
it demonstrates how easy it is to turn junk into gold.
Use those 10 bonds to create a CDO. By using a 
sample credit transition matrix,3 we can calculate 
the number of bonds in each tranche. Start with 
the assumption common before the crisis that the 
default correlations were zero, and increase to 50%, 
more typical of extreme economic downturns.
The following Table shows how many bonds would 
ﬁ  t into the various tranches, ranging from Aaa to B, 
with the remainder going into the equity tranche. 
When the default correlations are zero, 20% of the 
CDO get the highest rating Aaa, with the mezzanine 
tranches taking half. Simply by increasing the default 
correlations to 10% the Aaa tranche vanishes. By 
increasing the correlations to 30% the best we can 
do is Ba.
Table 1
Rating Aaa A Baa Ba B Equity
Moody’s default 
probabilities 0% 0.02% 0.16% 1.16% 6.03%
Default correlations Size of tranches
  0% 2 0 1 1 3 4
1 0 % 0 11126
30% 0 0 0 2 3 6
50% 0 0 0 0 5 6
3  Obtained from the Moody’s website, average one–year rating transitions: sample period: 1970–2004.
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This demonstrates the extreme sensitivity of CDOs 
to correlations. Such instruments are even more 
sensitive to correlations than market risk portfolios, 
while at the same time the problem of measuring 
the correlations is even harder for structured credit 
products. After all, this is annual risk, and the 
last economic downturn was only 17 observations 
ago, in 1992. That was the last time correlations 
increased. 
2| ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
  AND RISK FORECASTING
Statistical ﬁ  nancial models have procyclical effects 
on asset prices and risk – causing bubbles. When the 
statistical models in widespread use are dependent 
on similar distributional assumptions, they will tend 
to give similar signals to market participants.
Suppose asset values are rising. The models will 
pick up on that and forecast higher asset values in 
the future. If ﬁ   nancial institutions react to this, 
that fact by itself will endogenously cause values to 
increase. Similarly, measured risk will decrease. These 
processes become self reinforcing, eventually causing 
values to be seriously out of sync with the underlying 
economic fundamentals, whilst the risk measurements 
signiﬁ  cantly underestimate the real risk.
In the end, it takes an increasingly small event to 
burst the bubble and everything goes into reverse but 
at a much faster speed. The models will then send 
the opposite signals, negative returns and high–risk, 
further exasperating the problems.
Such effects have started to make their way into 
formal economic models and hopefully will soon 
be incorporated into risk models.
2|1  How risk measurements affect 
  the distribution of risk
Daníelsson  et al. (2009) explicitly model the 
endogeneity of risk, originally proposed by 
Daníelsson and Shin (2003). They consider the 
case where the risks impacting ﬁ  nancial markets 
are attributable (at least in part) to the actions of 
market participants. In turn, market participants’ 
actions depend on perceived risk. Market outcomes 
are directly affected by constraints on ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, how ﬁ   nancial regulations or other 
restrictions affect their behaviour.
The results indicate that risk constraints induce 
higher volatility and correlations. During times of 
ﬁ  nancial turmoil, correlations of returns increase 
with upward shifts in volatility. The model captures 
a common feature of asset price bubbles followed 
by a ﬁ  nancial crisis, where the markets go through 
long periods of high return amid low volatility. 
Then suddenly, with the ﬁ  rst hint of turbulence, 
the bubble bursts, giving rise to a pattern described 
by traders as going `up by the escalator but down 
by the elevator’.
The resulting shedding of exposures results in 
negative spillovers on other market participants from 
the sale of assets or withdrawal of credit. As prices 
fall or measured risks rise or previous correlations 
break down (or some combination of these), market 
participants respond by further cutting exposures. 
The global ﬁ  nancial crisis of 2007-9 contains many 
examples of such distress episodes. This category 
of models is likely to form the cornerstone of future 
systemic risk models.
2|2  Risk models are least reliable 
  when you need them the most
One lesson from the type of economic crisis models 
discussed above is that ﬁ  nancial risk models are 
least reliable when they are needed the most. 
Because they are conditional on the sample used in 
the estimation, they generally build in momentum 
type effects into the forecasts.
Bubbles are generally slow affairs, with prices 
increasing steadily with low volatility. When the 
bubbles burst the price dynamics change sharply, 
even overnight, implying a structural break in 
the statistical processes governing market prices, 
meaning that any risk model estimated before the 
bubble burst is no longer valid.
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2|3 Systemic  risk  measurement
A signiﬁ  cant focus of many recent proposals for 
the reform of the ﬁ  nancial system is systemic risk. 
Presumably, regulations would be designed to 
minimise future systemic risk, with the supervisors 
tasked with measuring systemic risk and reacting 
appropriately when it is perceived to be high. This 
is one of the ideas that sounds good in theory but 
whose time has not come in practice. 
The problem of systemic risk is much harder than 
risk measurements for a single ﬁ  nancial institution, 
not to mention individual asset risk measurements. 
The risk modeler has to take into account the 
individual and aggregate positions within a bank and 
then somehow aggregate that across the ﬁ  nancial 
system, explicitly incorporating feedback effects 
between institutions. 
A key element is how ﬁ  nancial institutions react 
to signals, if one perceives a negative shock and 
starts selling how does that affect other institutions. 
The feedback effects between ﬁ  nancial institutions 
will have to be the key ingredient in any future 
systemic risk model. What matters for such models 
is endogenous risk.  Such models are still at an early 
stage, with considerable research being conducted, 
but they are not yet ready for prime time.
3| IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATIONS
The challenges in measuring ﬁ  nancial risk directly 
affects the regulations of ﬁ  nancial  institutions. 
The trend in ﬁ  nancial regulations over the past few 
years and decades has been an increasing reliance 
on risk sensitivity. In principle, risk sensitivity is 
sensible, ﬁ  nancial institutions should hold more 
capital when activities are risky and measure and 
manage risk using state-of-the-art methods.
Such risk sensitivity, at least as envisioned in 
Basel II, only really is sensible if riskiness is risk 
and not uncertainty in the sense of Knight. 
3|1  Capital, risk and Basel II
Basel I was successful for its intended objectives, but 
has been due for an upgrade for a long time. However, 
for all its ﬂ  aws, it had one redeeming quality, it was 
not based on the notion of risk sensitivity. It does not 
really depend on measuring risk.
Basel II, by contrast, is founded on risk measurements. 
Both Pillar 2 with its emphasis on internal risk 
management and Pillar 1 with its focus on capital. 
The calculation of bank capitalisation is a surprisingly 
convoluted affair. Should the focus be on tier 2 and 
tier 1, only tier 1, narrower measures such as core 
tier 1, or even tangible equity?  Is the denominator 
composed of risk weighted assets (RWA) or total 
assets (TA)? 
In looking at tables showing bank capitalisations and 
rankings, very different pictures emerge dependent 
on whether one looks at something like tier 1/RWA 
as in Europe under Basel II, or the US leverage ratio 
tier 1/TA. Many ﬁ  nancial institutions have appeared 
well capitalised under the former measure but really 
poorly capitalised under the latter.
The reason is what may be called the ﬁ  nancial 
engineering premium. Sophisticated banks can make 
RWA really low by judicious measurement of risk, 
regardless of whether the assets contain a sizable 
chunk of toxic assets. They can not do that with 
total assets. 
One problem with risk weighted capital is that it is 
only as good as the quality of the risk measurements. 
If, as argued above, the problem of measuring risk 
is much harder than it is claimed, then immediately 
risk weighted capital becomes suspect. Perhaps then 
we don’t trust banks when they tell us they were well 
capitalised. Subsequently, they become stigmatised. 
Another problem with risk weighted capital is that it 
is inherently procyclical. 
The problems with Basel II are increasingly 
understood, but the criticism of it was there from 
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the start. For example, An academic response to Basel II 
in 2001 stated: 
￿ “value–at–risk can destabilise an economy and 
induce crashes when they would not otherwise occur.” 
￿ “The Basel Committee has chosen poor quality 
measures of risk when better risk measures are 
available.”
￿  “credit rating agencies …  are unregulated 
and the quality of their risk estimates is largely 
unobservable.” 
￿  “Financial regulation is inherently procyclical. 
Our view is that this set of proposals will, overall, 
exacerbate this tendency signiﬁ  cantly.”
￿ “In so far as the purpose of ﬁ  nancial regulation 
is to reduce the likelihood of systemic crisis, these 
proposals will actually tend to negate, not promote 
this useful purpose.” 
These views still have a resonance today.
3|2  Why are banks not lending
The basic principle of banking is that lending should 
reﬂ  ect risk. The unfortunate consequence of that is 
procyclicality, i.e., that ﬁ  nancial institutions lend 
too much in booms and too little in downturns. This 
is a basic facet of banking.
Financial regulations can either encourage or 
discourage this procyclicality, but generally they 
amplify it. Clearly, the notion of capital in Basel II 
is procyclical.  One reason for this was noted by 
Daníelsson and Zigrand (2008) who model the 
behaviour of ﬁ  nancial institutions when they are 
subject to risk constrains of the Basel type. They 
ﬁ  nd that such risk constraints and the implied 
heightened risk sensitivity has a particular perverse 
impact, making banks behave more alike, they 
will have to sell the same risky assets and buy the 
same assets. That by itself makes the prices of the 
risky assets fall, which further increases risk and 
erodes capital, causing banks to withdraw from risk 
activities at exactly the moment when we want them 
to do the opposite.
Indeed, the banks are now doing what they are 
supposed to do. They are being prudent. It is a 
bit disingenuous of regulators and politicians 
demanding that the banks increase lending when 
the banks are just following the regulations proposed 
and approved by the very entities. 
3|3 Hedge  funds
Hedge funds have remained unregulated, but now 
we see increasing calls for the regulations of hedge 
funds, e.g. within the European Union on the 
regulation of hedge funds. Hedge fund regulation 
has remained controversial. In a previous Banque 
de France Financial Stability Review article in 2007 
I argue that they should remain unregulated. Those 
arguments still hold today. 
Hedge funds have had little or no contribution to 
the crisis, and have in many cases been a positive 
inﬂ  uence by providing liquidity and purchasing 
distressed assets. By putting a ﬂ  oor under asset 
values, hedge funds and private equity ﬁ  rms directly 
help the regulated banks.
The main focus of proposals for hedge fund 
regulations seems to be registration and disclosure. 
Receiving disclosure from hedge funds is like 
drinking from a ﬁ  re hose. Many hedge funds do 
operate on the edge of the technological curve. The 
regulator, having to receive all that disclosure and 
using the numbers to understand systemic risk and 
would therefore be operating beyond the edge. 
Ill–conceived disclosure regimes provide little 
or no information about ﬁ   nancial stability, but 
have a downside of transferring responsibility to 
the supervisor.
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3|4 Compensation  in  banks
One avenue which is receiving considerable attention 
is compensation in ﬁ  nancial institutions. Certain 
individuals have been able to make exceptionally large 
bets and receive similarly outsized bonuses for their 
efforts. Now that many of these bets have failed how 
can such behaviours be prevented in the future? 
Many proposals are based on top executives receiving 
shares that are not convertible into cash for a few 
years, even until retirement. More junior staff might 
have to keep money in escrow accounts for a few years 
until the ﬁ  nal proﬁ  tability of the trades in aggregate 
is known — so–called cash claw back solutions. Both 
suffer from fundamental problems. 
First, because of the asymmetry between reward and 
punishment there is a promise of immense payoffs 
when things go well, with the only downside the loss 
of the reward if things go badly. The downside pain 
is not as big as the upside beneﬁ  t.
In the old days many ﬁ  nancial institutions had a 
partnership structure, with unlimited liability, which 
did directly expose the most senior management to 
downside risks. A failure of the bank might mean 
personal bankruptcy. Similarly, by having traders 
expose their personal wealth to trading positions, with 
permanent blacklisting in extreme cases, it would 
have the same effect.
Indeed, waiting for proﬁ  tability may not prevent the 
so–called “collecting pennies in front of a steamroller” 
trades, i.e., trades were the mean is small but positive, 
with very thick lower tail. It is quite easy to create such 
positions, e.g. with derivatives or credit instruments, 
but can be harder to detect, especially with statistical 
methods. If we lengthen the bonus cycle, the trader 
can simply lengthen the instrument cycle. 
Another avenue, and one proposed recently by the 
UK’s FSA4 is to risk adjust pay. The problem with such 
approaches is the accuracy of risk models and ability to 
game the models. Internal risk management ﬁ  nancial 
institutions can adjust models and create Chinese 
walls between those taking risk and those managing 
risk to prevent data mining. This is much harder 
when models are used for compensation because they 
become a part of the contractual agreement between 
the trader and the ﬁ   nancial institution. Making 
gaming a rather simple affair.
3|5  Utility banks and casino banks
The nature of banking has become an important 
topic for debate on regulatory reform, with many 
commentators calling for banks being split up 
along business lines. One model often heralded is 
the Glass–Steagall Act in the United States, which 
splits banks into investment and commercial banks. 
A more crude manifestation is the call for banks 
being split up into so called utility banks and casino 
banks, with the former providing useful banking 
services, and the rest taking risks. Generally, most 
such discussion calls for narrow banking.
In the Great Depression, countries with narrow 
banking, such as the United States, saw signiﬁ  cant 
parts of their banking systems collapse. Canada, 
just to name one counter example, experienced 
no banking failures. Its banks were comfortably 
universal and have remained so to this day.
Distinctions between utility banks and casino banks 
are arbitrary and losses can occur everywhere. 
Narrow banks are inevitably less diversiﬁ  ed, less 
stable, and less resistant to a crisis. Splitting banks 
up along business lines would be a mistake.
3|6  Do we know how to regulate banks?
The Basel II process demonstrates the difﬁ  culty in 
designing effective ﬁ  nancial regulations and the resistance 
to outside criticism. Ineffective regulations can lead to 
complacency and hence increase ﬁ  nancial instability. 
Badly designed regulations can impose signiﬁ  cant costs 
on the ﬁ  nancial system and the real economy whilst at 
the same time destabilising the system.
It is clear that widespread regulatory failures contributed 
to the crisis. However, the part of the ﬁ  nancial system 
most affected by the crisis is the most regulated, the 
banks. So the question of whether we did not regulate 
4 “Reforming remuneration practices in ﬁ  nancial services”, March 2009.
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enough or we don’t know how to regulate ﬁ  nancial 
institutions effectively has not been answered.
We are unlikely to see another banking crisis for quite a 
number of years. There is no immediate hurry to reform 
Regulations have failed. But the crisis did not happen because of a lack of regulations. The crisis is typical, 
banks lend to increasingly marginal credits, asset values are increasingly out of touch with the underlying 
economy and it takes increasingly little to burst the bubble. When that happens everything reverses but at 
much higher-speed.
This is how most ﬁ  nancial crisis has played out throughout history. The exact same process can be 
prevented from happening in the future, but surely the next crisis will take a different form, something 
completely unforeseen. One cannot regulate against such unforeseen events.
This is why, it would be preferable to study what went wrong and then in a few years carefully change 
regulations at a time when we know more. There is no hurry, we still haven’t solved this crisis and the next 
one will not come immediately after. The costs of inappropriate regulations are high and we have time to wait.
the current regulatory structures, it would be better to 
be prudent, take the necessary time to study how best to 
regulate, and then few years down the road implement 
an effective system. The Larosiere and Turner reports 
provide useful points for discussion. 
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